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Introduction
Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D.

This is a working paper prepared by staff to the Human
Subjects Subcommittee of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC). At the request of the subcommittee, the
paper attempts to set out the critical issues facing the commissioners concerning the recruitment and participation in clinical research of those who are decisionally impaired. The critical
issues considered in this working paper are as follows.
䡲

Should the individual’s informed consent always
be required for research participation?

䡲

Should individuals be able to execute substantive
advance research directives?

䡲

Should the patient’s legally authorized representative be empowered to make research participation decisions, and on what basis should he or
she decide?

䡲

Should legally authorized surrogates be empowered to make research participation decisions,
and on what basis should they decide?

䡲

Should those who are decisionally impaired, and
at high risk for decisional incapacity, be excluded from research?

䡲

Should the patient who decides to participate in
research be required to have appointed a legally
authorized representative to make subsequent
medical care decisions?

䡲

Should those who are decisionally incapacitated
be excluded from research?

䡲

Should research involving the decisionally
impaired or incapacitated be limited to that
which is relevant to a medical problem from
which the patient is suffering?

䡲

Should investigators be required to notify individuals that they have been found to be decisionally inacapacitated and that they are to be
entered into a research project without their
consent?
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䡲

Should consent auditors ever be required?

䡲

Should “reconsent” procedures ever be required?

䡲

Should “wraparound” studies ever be required?

䡲

Should placebo arms ever be prohibited?

䡲

Should the NBAC promulgate new regulations
concerning the participation in research of those
who are decisionally impaired, or should it rather
offer guidance for potential subjects, their physicians, clinical investigators, institutional review
boards, and other policymaking bodies?

Should the individual’s informed consent always
be required for research participation?
The Nuremberg Code is perhaps the most important touchstone of research ethics. The first sentence of the Code states
that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”1 As the field of medical ethics has grown, some
distinguished commentators have continued to defend the
view that no research is permissible without the subject’s
informed consent. They point out that scientific progress is
morally optional, while respect for human beings and their
self-determination is not.
Yet research with children and other populations has continued and flourished in the half century since Nuremberg.
These practices have been justified by seeking what many
regard as the moral equivalent of subject consent, including
parental permission and subject assent where feasible. A further
justification is that significant benefits to many individuals
would have to be foregone if the consent requirement were
strictly interpreted, but few have found strict interpretation
of the consent requirement to be morally obligatory. Various
standards and procedures have been established to protect the
well-being of subjects. It is also often noted that, since treatment of individuals for disease must continue, far more harm
would be done through the widespread clinical use of modalities that had not been subjected to controlled study.2
Instead, conditions have been placed on research with those
who cannot give their own consent. If research with children
and others who lack decisionmaking capacity can be ethically
acceptable, then presumably research with the decisionally
impaired, who may have various levels of decisionmaking
capacity, can also be done in a way that is ethically acceptable.3

1
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Foremost among the conditions that may be imposed on
research with those who are decisionally impaired or incapacitated is the gradually higher level of scrutiny that is accorded
research proposals as the risk-benefit ratio becomes less favorable. Conditions may be imposed concerning not only acceptable levels of risk, but also through recruitment and selection
of subjects, study design, consent processes, and independent monitoring.

Should individuals be able to execute substantive
advance research directives?
Some persons whose decisionmaking capacity is currently
intact may be able to anticipate a period of incapacity, perhaps
extending for the rest of their lives. Various neurodegenerative
diseases have this kind of course, including Alzheimer’s. By
the time an individual’s disease has progressed to a stage that is
of research interest, he or she may no longer be capable of
granting an informed consent. In theory, the individual may
make both substantive and procedural arrangements, while
capable, to enable study participation after a loss of decisionmaking capacity. An outstanding issue is whether such arrangements are acceptable approximations of the gold standard of
ethical research enrollment, the subject’s contemporaneous
informed consent.4
A substantive advance research directive would specify a
research project or projects that an individual would be prepared to enter, should he or she lose capacity. These advance
directives would be roughly equivalent to living wills for
standard treatment. States would presumably need to pass legislation recognizing such devices. One question is whether
federal regulations should recognize research advance directives
and take them into account in rules concerning subjects who
may lose their decisionmaking capacity before they can enter or
complete a study.
The idea of an “advance directive for research” appears to
be consistent with our society’s dominant philosophical
beliefs about control over one’s body and with other practices.
Some argue that, just as individuals may donate their remains
to medical schools and laboratories, so they should be permitted to commit themselves to a research project as living
subjects while they still have the ability to do so. This argument seems to gain strength when the anticipated research
participation holds some prospect of benefit to the incapacitated subject.5

Rebecca Dresser, “Research Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Review of Policy Issues and Proposals,” contract paper for National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1997, p.
5. Relevant portions of this paper will hereafter be cited in footnotes as Dresser, followed by the manuscript page number.
Dresser, p. 6.
Dresser, p. 8.
Dresser, pp. 41–51.
Dresser, pp. 51, passim.
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But potentially beneficial research for those who are incapacitated is the exceptional case; few studies offer even a remote
chance of benefit. Many contend that it is exploitive to permit
people, hoping desperately for a return to lucidity and health,
to make such a commitment, often well in advance of the
actual research intervention. They note that one’s views about
continued medical procedures may change as one’s illness
progresses, perhaps without the opportunity to review a
research living will once it has been executed. Further, how
can it be decided when the experimental involvement should
cease, especially in studies that did not offer benefit to the
subject in the first place?
If the idea of an advance directive for research is nevertheless attractive because of its consistency with our other values,
such as the protection and promotion of patient autonomy
and the advancement of medical knowledge, some conditions
could be placed on its use. For instance, research advance directives might only be valid when the research presents some
prospect of patient benefit, and strict time limits could be
imposed that require active renewal of the living will. Another
option is to require the appointment of a legally authorized
representative to make a decision about stopping participation in the study, as a condition of validity of the advance
directive for research.
There is another objection to research advance directives
that is rather different from those mentioned above and that
many find decisive. The incapacitated patient may be aware
of being subjected to various experimental procedures, but be
unable to understand their significance or appreciate that they
had been consented to in advance. A person with waxing and
waning awareness, often highly medicated and perhaps physically restrained, could experience study procedures as quite
disturbing, and even as a kind of torture. To minimize this
possibility, careful protections would need to be constructed,
including perhaps the advance appointment of an alternative
decision maker who could stop study participation at the least
sign of subject distress.

Should the patient’s legally authorized
representative be empowered to make research
participation decisions, and on what basis
should he or she decide?
In anticipation of a period of incapacity, many individuals
have appointed others to make treatment decisions on their
behalf. The authority to appoint such representatives, who are
often called health care agents, has been recognized in the laws
of many states, technically known as the “durable power of
attorney” (DPA). In general, the health care agent is obligated
to make medical decisions that are in accord with the patient’s
6

previously expressed wishes, or, if those wishes are unknown
to the agent, consistent with the patient’s expressed values.
Failing that, the health care agent should make decisions that
advance the patient’s medical best interests.6
Many have advocated extending this legal authority to enable
the representative to make research participation decisions.
There are several situations in which such an arrangement has
practical appeal. Often individuals “fail” standard therapy but
are incapable of deciding about trying to take advantage of a
medication or device still under study. Or a person may not
have anticipated becoming ill and, suddenly incapacitated,
may have had no time to consider whether some experimental
treatment might be preferable to a standard therapy. Or an
individual may become decisionally incapacitated in the course
of medical care without having considered the next step in his
or her treatment. Finally, some may find donating their body
to a research project to be a highly desirable and satisfying way
to exit, but, rather than leave this to chance, wish a representative to identify a worthwhile scientific effort taking place at
the time of death.
In one important sense, the power to appoint a “research
agent” is an expression of the patient’s self-determination,
for which all sorts of provisions are currently made in the delivery of health care. If individuals are empowered to identify
those whom they wish to speak for them in making decisions
about recognized medical interventions, then why not extend
this authority to emerging medical alternatives?
One important difference between reliance on health care
agents in the standard treatment setting and in the research
setting is that recognizing the authority to decide about someone else’s care seems to be more easily justifiable when there is
good reason to believe that the intervention will be in that
person’s interest. Experimental procedures or maneuvers are
not undertaken with the primary goal of subject benefit, but
rather are intended to help advance knowledge about the
problem motivating the study. Allowing other persons to decide
about making someone an experimental subject, even when
the individual in question has authorized them to do so, is a
qualitative departure from ordinary DPA arrangements. Such
decisions may entail considerable risks with little likelihood
of substantial benefit.
Though great deference is given to individual self-determination in our political system, there does seem to be a legitimate
societal interest when a private arrangement may present
significant harm to the individual initiating it, in the absence
of a reasonable prospect of offsetting advantages. Weighing
against this societal interest is the possibility that greater
medical knowledge may accrue to society in permitting these
arrangements to go forward in spite of their risks. In some
cases, the rejection of those who would make themselves

Dresser, pp. 29–36.
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available for research through an agent could significantly
hamper studies of the condition that led to the person’s current incapacity.
A balance might be struck by limiting the conditions under
which the health care agent’s authority would be valid. For
instance, studies that present no prospect of direct benefit to
the subject, but entail significant risk, could be ineligible for
enrollment via a DPA. Studies that entail minimal risk could be
regarded as consistent with a patient’s best medical interests
and therefore permissible, even though they do not advance
those interests.
Alternatively, a representative’s decision could be subject to
review to establish that it is consistent with what is known
about the patient’s wishes. But (short of intervention by a court
of law), it is not at all clear how such a challenge could be
warranted, especially if the patient leaves no written statement
about his or her attitudes toward research. How should other
responsible parties, like researchers and IRBs, assess whether
the patient’s representative, in enrolling the patient in research,
is truly acting in accordance with the patient’s wishes and
values? Unlike treatment DPAs, one test that would have very
limited applicability is the best interests of the patient. Since
studies are not designed to satisfy individual subjects’ medical
interests (though that may be a happy by-product of a study),
to say that a study is in a person’s best interests, especially
when that person no longer has capacity, is often going to be
far-fetched. For many, this limitation on objective review of
a representative’s decisions is important enough to reject procedural arrangements.
In partial amelioration of this problem, at least from the
standpoint of potential harms to subjects, a warning to representatives might be appropriate in some cases. For example,
legally authorized representatives could be informed of the
possibility that the research would add to the patient’s risk of
harm or discomfort. Were such information made part of the
process, the difference between the expected course with and
without research should be clearer to the lay person representing the decisionally incapacitated person.
Procedural advance directives, like DPAs, offer at least two
advantages over substantive research advance directives. The
first is that they are far more flexible than statements about
preferred or permissible interventions. The second advantage,
and one especially pertinent to patients who suffer from some
degree of decisional impairment, is that it may be much easier
to designate a representative whom one trusts than to assess
the relative risks and benefits of a research study. Thus, it may
be argued, if one wishes to grant patients the right to research
participation when they no longer have decisionmaking capacity, then the approach that is most reliable concerning their
expressed choice is probably the procedural one. However, it
must be granted that there is little evidence for this argument,
however intuitively plausible it may seem.
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One objection to research DPAs is also an objection to
research advance directives and, indeed, to any study participation by the decisionally impaired: that the disoriented patientsubject may feel imprisoned and forced to undergo procedures
without understanding, even though they have been authorized by the legally authorized representative. This could be a
terrifying, nightmarish experience for a decisionally impaired
person. Although a procedural advance directive may reduce
this risk, it remains a serious concern and may require more
than one protective mechanism for the impaired subject.

Should legally authorized surrogates be
empowered to make research participation
decisions, and on what basis should they decide?
Usually people who lose decisionmaking capacity have not
created an advance directive. Sometimes members of their
family or other caretakers are identified as suitable surrogates
in granting permission to enter them into research. But these
arrangements have, at best, an uncertain legal standing. Regulations could recognize state legislation that established in
the law what is now a matter of common practice by granting
“natural” surrogates (such as family members or close friends)
a specific role in the research recruitment process for decisionally impaired persons.
An obvious objection to such arrangements is that, unlike a
representative appointed by the patient in advance, the surrogate’s standing as a substitute decision maker may arise only
from the law. To many the moral basis for the surrogate’s
authority appears inadequate, especially in the research context, because he or she has not been selected by the potential
subject. According to many bioethicists, surrogates are supposed to act on the patient’s behalf in accordance with their
“substituted judgement.” But there is no guarantee that even a
close relative is aware of the patient’s preferences or values
with respect to standard medical treatments, let alone research
participation, or even that the surrogate will act on those
preferences or values if they are known. A surrogate may only
be able to decide based on the patient’s medical best interests.
A “medical best interests” standard will not apply to studies
that offer no prospect of direct benefit to the subject.
However questionable the legal basis of this process, a large
number of research subjects have been recruited through identification of a surrogate and restrictions on these measures
would constitute a severe blow to a great deal of research on
diseases that involve cognitive disabilities. And many studies do
hold out the prospect of direct benefit, including the use of new
drugs and medical monitoring. One option would be to recognize in regulation the role of surrogates in research that involves
only procedures that are potentially beneficial to the subject,
or that entail no more than minimum risk.
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Should those who are decisionally impaired and
at high risk for decisional incapacity be excluded
from research?
In the final analysis, both substantive and procedural advance
directives for research are at best problematic. The underlying difficulty is that, unlike the usual medical circumstances
for which these legal devices have been designed, in a research
context the individual is giving himself or herself over, in
advance, to an enterprise that is likely to be of benefit only
to the society at large, through the advancement of medical knowledge.
Considering the inherent limitations of measures intended
to enable the incapacitated research subject to continue to
have a voice in his or her treatment, it may be argued that those
who are at greatest risk of decisional incapacity should simply
be excluded from research. Were the assessment of risk for loss
of decisional capacity required prior to enrollment in a study,
the remaining subjects would be those who are less likely to
require the application of substantive or procedural advance
directives, though these devices might still be a condition of
study participation.
There are several objections to a rule-out procedure based
on the prospect of a potential subject’s losing decisionmaking capacity. First, although the prospect of decisional
incapacity is often clear, especially in progressive diseases or
when a patient is going to be heavily medicated, in many cases
the loss of capacity is not so predictable. Second, however one
weighs the importance of advancing medical knowledge,
prohibiting research on those most likely to lose capacity
would create a significant obstacle to the study of some
diseases in their most debilitating stages. Third, some research
may be concerned with determining at what dosage a drug
impairs cognitive function, an issue that could be of great
importance to preventing future patients from losing their
decisionmaking ability. Fourth, the proposed exclusion
would not avoid instances of uncertainty about the meaning
of a substantive advance directive or the propriety of a decision made by representative empowered through a procedural
advance directive.
Nonetheless, the idea that ethical problems raised by incapacity should be avoided if possible has intuitive force. One
approach could be to require that a research project begin
by enrolling those least likely to lose their decisionmaking
ability during the study period, and that the selection of
at-risk subjects be justified by the particular goals of the
study. A different approach would look again to the riskbenefit ratio, excluding prospective subjects from certain
studies depending on their likely ability to make future decisions, as well as the anticipated level of risk.

Should the patient who decides to participate in
research be required to have appointed a legally
authorized representative to make subsequent
medical care decisions?
Apart from decisions having to do specifically with continuing
study participation, medical decisions must often be made
while a patient is enrolled in research. To avoid confusion about
who is authorized to make medical care decisions if the subject
loses capacity, investigators might be required to ensure that
all subjects have a legally authorized representative. In some
jurisdictions this may require that the subject appoint a health
care agent prior to enrollment in a study.
From the researcher’s standpoint, it also seems prudent to
ensure that a patient with a decisional impairment not be left
without a representative to make health care decisions; such
a representative could help the study team avoid problems if
treatment issues arise. However, there may be confusion about
the limits of the representative’s authority, since it may not
extend to issues having to do with the research itself. For
example, conceivably the patient’s medical care representative could decide that continued participation in a current
research project is incompatible with the patient’s medical
well-being and could have the power to remove the patient
from the study, but lack the power to enroll the patient in a
different research project.

Should those who are decisionally incapacitated
be excluded from research?
One way to avoid the practical and philosophical problems
with justifying research with those who are no longer able to
consent would be to exclude such individuals from being part
of research. A wholesale exclusion from research of those
who lack decisionmaking ability would square with the letter of
the Nuremberg Code, but would not be consistent with
research practices even in the decades since the code was
written. In general, it is thought that ethical research with
human subjects who cannot give informed consent can be and
has been conducted, especially if some form of advance directive or surrogate decision making arrangement is in place.
Several subsequent ethics guidelines (including those of the
Helsinki declarations of the World Medical Association and
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science) have endorsed research with those unable to consent
under certain conditions. Recent scholarship indicates that
even the Nuremberg Code itself was not intended to refer to
clinical research with those who are ill, but to research with
normal subjects.
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Furthermore, though it is controversial, the recently
authorized exception to informed consent requirements for
certain emergency research is a greater departure from the
Code’s voluntary consent requirement than any contemplated
herein concerning research with those who are decisionally
incapacitated. A primary consideration in the creation of
the narrow exception to the federal rules was the need for
improvements in the care of emergent, life-threatening conditions. A similar argument can be mounted on behalf of the
improved treatment of those who are or are at risk for a loss
of decisionmaking ability.

Should research involving the decisionally
impaired or incapacitated be limited to that
which is relevant to a medical problem from
which the patient is suffering?
Some “vulnerable” or “special” populations are currently
accorded a particular protection in the regulations to ensure
that they are not unfairly burdened with involvement in
research simply because they are easily available. Thus, prison
research is to be limited to conditions that especially affect
that population. Considering that the decisionally impaired
are often not only institutionalized but may also be unable to
speak for themselves, their position bears earmarks of special
vulnerability. One important justification for involving those
with decisional impairments in research is the need for progress in the treatment of certain diseases. In order to thwart
the temptation to engage them in research simply because they
are more available than others, it may be appropriate to restrict
research involving decisionally impaired persons to that which
is relevant to conditions responsible for the impairment
itself. A less restrictive rule would limit research to that which
is relevant to conditions that tend to afflict those who are
decisionally impaired.

Should investigators be required to notify
individuals that they have been found to be
decisionally inacapacitated and that they are
to be entered into a research project without
their consent?
To be found decisionally incapable and then enrolled in
research according to alternative decisionmaking arrangements
is to have certain of one’s rights curtailed, however justifiable
the curtailment research may be. Some argue that whenever an
individual is found to be decisionally incapable, the individual
should be put on notice of this finding, especially when it could
have important consequences for the individual’s medical
7
8
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treatment, as in the case of enrollment as a subject.7
Such an notification process will often be an empty ritual.
Worse, a requirement that implies a duty to so inform those
who are in an advanced stage of dementia prior to research
involvement could well contribute to undermining health
professionals’ respect for the regulatory system. Nevertheless,
to be unaware that one has been found decisionally incapable
is to be deprived of the opportunity to seek review and perhaps of the right to judicial intervention. The implications of
such a determination, including the loss of control over one’s
own person, are among the most serious one can imagine for
a liberal, democratic society.
Rather than require that all individuals who have been found
to be decisionally incapacitated be informed of that finding
prior to their enrollment in a study, such a rule may be limited
to those potential subjects who show any signs of consciousness. The notification would also enable the patient to assent
to his or her research role, by no means a trivial recognition
of individual dignity.

Should consent auditors ever be required?
The consent auditor is one device that has frequently been
suggested as an additional procedural protection in the recruitment of research subjects who may be decisionally impaired.
The consent auditor, who is not a member of the study team
but perhaps a member of the IRB or an institutional ethicist,
witnesses the consent process and then either certifies the
consent as valid, or informs the principal investigator that an
individual is not able to give valid consent.8
The consent auditor may be adopted as an alternative or as
a complement to the blanket notification requirement discussed above. Rather than requiring researchers to engage in
what will often be an empty ritual, consent auditors could be
required for potential subjects who have conditions associated with a decisional impairment. A system of audited consent
will require a substantial investment by research institutions.
The requirement may be limited to studies that have certain
characteristics, such as those that involve greater than minimal
risk and/or those that do not hold out the prospect of direct
benefit to the subject.

Should “reconsent” procedures ever be required?
Studies with those who are decisionally impaired may take
place over extended periods. One of the essential conditions of
ethical research is continued voluntary participation, but those
who are deeply involved with and dependent upon the health
care system may not feel able to disenroll from a study. A

Another way to express this issue is whether the assent of incapable subjects should be required. Dresser, pp. 36–40.
Dresser, pp. 22–25.
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requirement for periodic “reconsenting” would help ensure
that a patient’s continued involvement is truly voluntary by
giving “permission” to leave the study. Such a requirement
would also provide the occasion to reassess decisionmaking
capacity, and it could trigger an advance directive or surrogate
arrangement. Reconsent mechanisms conform with the spirit
of informed consent as a process rather than a single event,
and with the view of human research participants as collaborators rather than as passive subjects.9
Reconsenting is, however, another labor-intensive measure
that would add to the cost and complexity of the human
research system. Yet a number of long-term studies already
include such a procedure. A reconsent requirement could be
attached to certain studies depending on their length and the
condition of the individuals to be included, such as those
with progressive neurological disorders.

Should “wraparound” studies ever be required?
With or without a decisional impairment, many who are ill
and candidates for a research study can suffer from the “therapeutic misconception,” the notion that the research maneuvers
or procedures might be of personal benefit even though that
possibility has clearly been ruled out in the consent process.
One way to deal with the therapeutic misconception is to
incorporate a non-research or “wraparound” phase into the
project, one that provides the subject with some beneficial
intervention independent of the study itself.
A serious problem with a wraparound phase is that it may
shift the balance in the opposite and equally problematic
direction of the therapeutic misconception, by providing
an inappropriate incentive to study participation in order to
derive the benefits of a recognized therapeutic strategy without
payment. On the other hand, wraparounds could be suitable
follow-ups to certain kinds of research that involve the provocation of symptoms.

Should placebo arms ever be prohibited?
Many decisional impairments are associated with psychiatric
disorders that can be managed symptomatically with neuroleptic medication. When a known risk of placebo is the return of
symptoms, it may be argued that it is unethical to include a
placebo arm. Thus, some contend that new drug investigations
should be controlled by measures against standard therapy,
in spite of the methodological shortcomings of such designs.
A basis for excluding placebo arms in particular studies could
be an individualized assessment that concludes that certain
patients would be at high risk for relapse if their current therapeutic regimen was discontinued, that a “drug holiday” is not
9

contemplated for this patient apart from enrollment in a study,
and that standard therapy is generally considered effective if
not ideal. However, any change in human subjects regulations
concerning permissible research design should presumably
accommodate other federal requirements for drug approval.
When drug-free research is conducted (whether as part of a
“blinded” placebo-controlled study or otherwise), it is important to follow patient-subjects who are at risk for relapse. Presumably, under current regulations for “vulnerable” subjects,
IRBs should take such arrangements into account when evaluating research proposals. One regulatory option is to require
investigators to explain how they propose to monitor subjects
for symptom relapse in studies with a drug-free component
that enroll decisionally impaired individuals with a history of
psychiatric disorders.

Should the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission promulgate new regulations
concerning the participation in research of
those who are decisionally impaired, or
should it rather offer guidance for potential
subjects, their physicians, clinical investigators,
institutional review boards, and other
policymaking bodies?
The desirability of governmental regulation depends not only
on the importance of the policy enunciated or the practices
addressed, but also on the rules’ ultimate efficacy. Presumably,
the least formal measures taken by governmental entities are
the preferred ones, so long as those measures are consistent
with achieving the important societal goals that have been
identified. Many who are familiar with the current federal regulations concerning human subjects research complain that
they are already unjustifiably complex and bureaucratic. Some
of those engaged in research on conditions related to decisional impairment are fearful that further regulation affecting these
populations will unnecessarily retard scientific progress and
stigmatize individuals who may be suitable subjects.
But many others note that, in spite of the imperfections of the
current regulations, the period since their enactment has been
largely free of the sorts of large-scale controversies that helped
give rise to them. It may also urged that the issues discussed in
this working paper illustrate some of the shortcomings of the
common rule. The commission will need to determine whether
issues concerning the decisionally impaired in research are of
such a magnitude that new regulations are required, or whether
some or all of the reforms it may determine are indicated could
be advanced through another mechanism, such as a statement
of recommendations for relevant parties.

There are related suggestions. See Dresser, pp. 26–27.
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